Ensuring that a distributed system with strict dependability constraints meets its prescribed speci cation is a growing challenge that confronts software developers and system engineers. This paper presents a technique for probing and fault injection of fault-tolerant distributed protocols. The proposed technique, called script-driven probing and fault injection, can be used for studying the behavior of distributed systems and for detecting design and implementation errors of faulttolerant protocols. The focus of this work is on fault injection techniques that can be used to demonstrate three aspects of a target protocol: i) detection of design or implementation errors, ii) identi cation of violations of protocol speci cations, and iii) insight into design decisions made by the implementors. The emphasis of our approach is on experimental techniques intended to identify speci c \problems" in a protocol or its implementation rather than the evaluation of system dependability through statistical metrics such as fault coverage.
Ensuring that a distributed system with strict dependability constraints meets its prescribed speci cation is a growing challenge that confronts software developers and system engineers. This paper presents a technique for probing and fault injection of fault-tolerant distributed protocols. The proposed technique, called script-driven probing and fault injection, can be used for studying the behavior of distributed systems and for detecting design and implementation errors of faulttolerant protocols. The focus of this work is on fault injection techniques that can be used to demonstrate three aspects of a target protocol: i) detection of design or implementation errors, ii) identi cation of violations of protocol speci cations, and iii) insight into design decisions made by the implementors. The emphasis of our approach is on experimental techniques intended to identify speci c \problems" in a protocol or its implementation rather than the evaluation of system dependability through statistical metrics such as fault coverage.
To demonstrate the capabilities of this technique, the paper describes a probing and fault injection tool, called the PFI tool (Probe/Fault Injection Tool), and a summary of several extensive experiments that studied the behavior of two protocols: the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) (Braden, 1989 , Postel, 1981 ) and a group membership protocol (GMP) (Jahanian et al., 1993 ).
INTRODUCTION
As software for distributed systems becomes more complex, ensuring that a system meets its prescribed speci cation is a growing challenge that confronts software developers and system engineers. Meeting this challenge is particularly important for distributed applications with strict dependability constraints since they must provide the required services under various failure scenarios. As we are witnessing a convergence of key technologies, emerging new applications, and market needs in this decade, we can expect that distributed systems will become more complex and that an increasing number of them will have to operate under strict availability and reliability requirements. In this paper, we present a technique, called script-driven probing and fault injection (Dawson and Jahanian, 1995) , for studying the behavior of distributed systems and for testing the fault tolerance capabilities of distributed applications and communication protocols. The proposed technique is motivated by several observations:
In testing a distributed system, one may wish to coerce the system into certain states to ensure that speci c execution paths are taken. This requires the ability to orchestrate a distributed computation into \hard-to-reach" states. Asynchronous communication and inherent nondeterminism of distributed computations introduce additional complexity. One must be able to order certain concurrent events to ensure that certain global states can be reached. In testing the fault-tolerance capabilities of a distributed system, one often requires certain behavior from a protocol participant that may be impossible to achieve under normal conditions. This may require the emulation of \misbehaving" participants by injecting faults into the system. Testing organizations often require a methodology that does not instrument the code being tested. This is particularly important for testing existing systems or when the source code is unavailable. Most existing testing and fault injection approaches depend heavily on probabilistic (or random) test generation. Orchestrating a distributed computation into a particular execution path requires deterministic approaches.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the approach for probing and fault injection of distributed systems. Section 3 describes the implementation of the PFI tool based on the proposed approach. Section 4 discusses in detail the experimental results from studying several implementations of TCP and GMP protocols. Section 5 describes related work. Sections 6 and 7 present the limitations of the proposed approach including the intrusiveness issue, and they describe future research directions of this work.
APPROACH 2.1. Script-Driven Probing and Fault Injection
The proposed approach views a distributed protocol as an abstraction through which a collection of participants communicate by exchanging a set of messages, in the same spirit as the x-Kernel (Hutchinson and Peterson, 1991) . In this model, we make no distinction between application-level protocols, interprocess communication protocols, network protocols, or device layer protocols. As shown in Figure 1 (a), each protocol is speci ed as a layer in the protocol stack such that each layer, from the device-level to the application-level protocol, provides an abstract communication service to higher layers. Determining whether or not a protocol implementation meets its prescribed speci cation requires orchestrating the system execution in a deterministic manner. The proposed approach relies on intercepting and ltering messages between protocol participants. In particular, a probe/fault injection (PFI ) layer is inserted between any two consecutive layers in a protocol stack. The PFI layer can execute deterministic or randomlygenerated test scripts to probe the participants and inject various faults into the system. By intercepting and ltering messages between two layers in a protocol stack, the PFI layer can delay, drop, reorder, duplicate, and modify messages. Furthermore, the PFI layer can introduce spontaneous messages into the system to probe the participants and to orchestrate the system execution into a particular path. PFI layer scripts have the ability to recognize di erent message types, which allows them to perform ltering and fault injection based on message type. Figure 1(a) illustrates how the nodes in a distributed system run a modi ed protocol stack to test Layer 2, which we will call the target protocol. The protocol stack is modi ed so that the target protocol layer is encapsulated between the driver and PFI layers. The driver and PFI layers are then used to examine and to manipulate the messages exchanged between participants in the target protocol. The driver layer is responsible for generating messages and running the test. The PFI layer intercepts all messages entering and leaving the target protocol. The PFI layer can manipulate messages to/from the target layer as they pass through the protocol stack, and it can introduce spontaneous messages into the system. These spontaneous messages can be used to probe target protocol participants on other nodes and observe their behavior. During the test, the driver and PFI layers may communicate with each other and are able to coerce the system into particular states. The driver and PFI layers communicate with each other during the test and can coerce the system into certain states. The reason for having layers both above and below the target layer is to allow creation of new messages and manipulation of messages generated by other participants in a protocol. Since the PFI layer sits below the target layer, it can drop, delay, and corrupt messages, but it may not be able to generate messages because it cannot manipulate data structures in the target protocol. Generating messages above the target layer ensures that data structures in the target protocol are updated properly. The driver and PFI layers interpret scripts which control their actions as messages are exchanged between protocol participants. As shown in Figure 1(b) , the PFI layer runs a script, called the send lter, each time a message is pushed (or sent down) the protocol stack. It runs another script, called the receive lter, each time a message is popped (or sent up) the protocol stack. These scripts perform three types of operations on messages:
1. Message ltering: for intercepting and examining a message.
2. Message manipulation: for dropping, delaying, reordering, duplicating, or modifying a message.
3. Message injection: for probing a participant by introducing a new message into the system. The packet recognition/generation stubs shown in Figure 1(b) are invoked to determine the message type whenever a message in intercepted by the PFI layer. An interface from the send/receive scripts to the stubs exists so that the scripts can determine what types of messages they are operating on. The send/receive scripts can also use the packet generation stub to generate messages of certain types at the PFI layer. The packet stubs are written by people who know the packet formats of the target protocol. A packet stub may be written by the protocol developer for an applicationlevel protocol, or it may be supplied by the system for a popular protocol such as TCP whose packet formats are known. Message generation may only be performed if it is not necessary to update the state of the target protocol in order to track the injected message. An example of this is the generation of a spurious ACK message in TCP. The message may be generated and sent, and the TCP need not keep track of it. In contrast, when generating a new data message in TCP, the internal state of the TCP must be updated. In particular, the current sequence number must be used and the data must be saved so that it may be retransmitted if necessary. Because the PFI layer does not have access to the data structures of the target layer, it is not capable of performing actions which alter the internal state of the target layer (in this case, TCP). In such cases, the message may be generated by the driver layer, because when the driver layer sends data through the target protocol, all necessary data structures will be updated correctly.
Failure Models and Script Speci cation
Testing the fault-tolerance capabilities of a protocol implementation requires the emulation of misbehaving participants by injecting various types of faults into the system. Hence, techniques that exercise the faulttolerance capabilities of a distributed system must take into consideration the various ways in which a protocol implementation may fail. A protocol participant is faulty if it deviates from its prescribed speci cation. A model of failures species in what way a protocol participant can deviate from its correct speci cation. The fault injection approach introduced earlier can test the fault-tolerance capabilities of protocol implementations under various failure models commonly found in the distributed systems literature including: process crash failures, link crash failures, send omission failures, receive omission failures, timing/performance failures, and arbitrary/byzantine failures. A formal treatment of these failure models is beyond the scope of this presentation (Hadzilacos and Toueg, 1993) . Scripts are at the heart of this approach. Scripts are instructions that are executed by the driver and the probe/fault injection (PFI ) layer to orchestrate the system computation into a particular state and to inject various kinds of faults into a system. A system designer must be able to specify su ciently powerful scripts for manipulating the messages exchanged in a distributed computation. We must emphasize that the scripts serve a dual purpose. They are used for: speci cation of the instructions to orchestrate a distributed computation into a desired state, and speci cation of the fault(s) to be injected into the system once a certain state is reached.
We believe that inventing a new scripting language is not the solution. Instead, modifying and supporting a popular interpreted language with a collection of predened libraries gives the user a very e ective tool which allows him/her to write most scripts. It also eases the burden of learning a new language for users already familiar with whatever interpreted language is chosen. Furthermore, if a script written in this interpreted language can invoke user-de ned procedures which can modify the internal state of the protocol, then the system designer has the ability to write scripts which can perform complex actions. This is a powerful tool because changing the scripts to perform new or di erent tests does not require re-compiling the PFI layer. The only time a re-compilation is required is when the library routines are changed. (As mentioned in Section 3, we use Tcl as the scripting language in the implementation of our tool. Tcl allows users to de ne their own extensions, usually written in C, to the scripting language.) Our experience during the past year supports the view that a rich set of prede ned library routines can help the system designer to develop powerful scripts in a very short time. In particular, prede ned procedures can be used for ltering messages based on the header or content, reordering events in a run to ensure that certain global states are reachable, and delaying certain message types by speci c times.
PROBE/FAULT INJECTION (PFI ) TOOL
In order to demonstrate the e ectiveness of the approach presented in Section 2, we developed a tool based on the concept of script-driven probing and fault injection. We also performed extensive experimental studies of several commercial and prototype distributed protocols. This section introduces a brief overview of the tool; the next section presents a detailed discussion of our experiments. The Probing and Fault Injection (PFI ) tool was initially developed on the x-Kernel running on Mach 3.0 and was later ported to SunOS. The tool may be inserted into a protocol stack as a separate layer below a target protocol. Figure 2 illustrates Recognition/generation procedures: are used to recognize and generate di erent types of packets. They allow the script writer to perform di erent actions based on message type, and also to create new messages to be injected into the system. Common procedures: are commonly used procedures used by scripts written for testing any protocol. Procedures which drop or log messages fall into this category. Also included are procedures which can generate probability distributions. Communication procedures: allow the di erent lters (send and receive) to communicate information to each other. These allow one lter script to set variables or state in the other lter. User de ned procedures: speci ed by the user of the PFI tool to test his/her protocol. These procedures are typically written in C and are linked into the tool. The user can then write scripts which use the procedures to perform special functions during testing of their protocol.
One of the main bene ts of script driven probing and fault injection is that testing di erent failure scenarios is accomplished simply by using di erent scripts. Changing scripts does not require re-compilation of the tool. This reduces the time required to run multiple of di erent tests, compared to a system in which some re-compilation is necessary.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section describes the results of extensive experiments on several commercial implementations of TCP and a prototype implementation of a Group Membership Protocol (GMP). These experiments were conducted to demonstrate the capabilities of the PFI tool described in Section 3. Three aspects of the target protocols were demonstrated: i) detection of design or implementation errors, ii) identi cation of violations of protocol speci cations, and iii) insight into design decisions made by the implementors. The fault injection experiments and their results are summarized in the following two subsections.
Testing of TCP
The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is an endto-end transport protocol that provides reliable transfer and ordered delivery of data. TCP is connectionoriented protocol and it uses ow-control between protocol participants to operate over network connections that are inherently unreliable. Because TCP is designed to operate over links of di erent speeds and reliability, it is widely used on the Internet. TCP was originally de ned in RFC-793 (Postel, 1981) and was updated in RFC-1122 (Braden, 1989) . In order to meet the TCP standard, an implementation must follow both RFCs. To test vendor TCP implementations, we modi ed an x-Kernel protocol stack to include a layer which incorporates the PFI tool described in Section 3. The PFI layer sits directly between the TCP and IP layers of the protocol stack. The resulting protocol stack is shown in Figure 3 . The gure shows one machine running Mach with the modi ed x-Kernel protocol stack. This machine is connected to a network which has machines running vendor TCP implementations. For these experiments, connections are opened between the vendor TCP implementations and the x-Kernel TCP. Faults are then injected into the system from the x-Kernel protocol stack and the behavior of the vendor implementations is monitored. We ran experiments on four di erent vendor implementations of TCP. These were the native TCP implementations of SunOS 4.1.3, Solaris 2.3, AIX 3.2.3, and NeXT Mach, which is based on Mach 2.5. The results were similar for the SunOS, AIX, and NeXT Mach implementations, which are based on BSD Unix. Solaris, which is a System V implementation, behaved somewhat di erently than the others in most experiments. Five experiments were performed as described below. The results of each experiment are summarized in tabular form for ease of reference.
Experiment 1. TCP retransmission intervals
This experiment examines how di erent implementations of TCP retransmit dropped data segments. TCP uses timeouts and retransmission of segments to assure reliable delivery of data segments. Each time the sender sends a data segment, a timeout for the segment is set. If an acknowledgment is not received before the expiration of the timeout, the data is assumed lost and is retransmitted. When the data is retransmitted, another timeout is set to keep track of when the acknowledgment is expected. The TCP speci cation states that for successive retransmissions of the same segment, the retransmission timeout should increase exponentially. It also states that an upper bound on retransmissions may be imposed. This experiment tested how vendor TCP implementations retransmitted segments. In the experiment, a connection was opened to x-Kernel machine from the each vendor machine. The receive lter script of the PFI layer was con gured such that after allowing thirty packets through without dropping or delaying their ACKs, all incoming packets were dropped. In order to monitor the retransmission behavior of the SunOS 4.1.3, Solaris 2.3, AIX 3.2.3, and NeXT Mach implementations, each packet was logged with a timestamp by the receive lter script before it was dropped. When the PFI layer started dropping messages, no further data was received by the TCP layer of the x-Kernel machine and so no ACKs were sent. The results of the experiment are summarized in Table 1 . The SunOS 4.1.3 machine retransmitted the packet twelve times before sending a TCP reset and closing the connection. The timeout on the retransmissions increased exponentially until it reached 64 seconds, at which point it leveled o . This was the upper bound on the retransmission timeout. In most cases, the Sun sent the next segment in the sequence space soon after the initial transmission of the dropped segment. This is so that if the original segment was only delayed in the network, the ACK was delayed or dropped, or the receiving TCP was using delayed ACKs, data is not retransmitted because it need not be. By transmitting the next segment in the sequence space, the sending TCP was simply eliciting an ACK for both segments at the same time. After not receiving the ACK for either segment, the original segment was retransmitted until the connection was timed out and dropped. Behavior on the RS/6000 running AIX 3.2.3 and the NeXT machine running Mach was essentially the same as that of the SunOS 4.1.3 machine. The segment was retransmitted twelve times before a reset was sent and the connection was dropped. The timeout on the retransmissions increased exponentially until it reached an upper bound of 64 seconds. In all cases, both machines transmitted the next segment soon after the segment which was dropped, but when no ACK was received, No upper bound was established because the connection closed before stabilizing at one. Also, there was a very short lower bound on retransmissions (330 milliseconds as opposed to 1 second used in other implementations )
One possible reason for this is to increase performance on high speed local area networks. The RFC states that a lower bound of 1 second is probably inadequate for high speed LANs. they started transmitting the original segment until the connection was timed out and dropped. The Solaris 2.3 implementation behaved di erently than the others. The Solaris TCP retransmitted the packet nine times before dropping the connection. The retransmission timeout increased exponentially, but did not stabilize at an upper bound before the connection was dropped. The reason was that the lower bound on retransmissions was very short (an average of 330 milliseconds over 30 runs). The exponential backo of the RTO started from around 330 milliseconds, and by the time the connection was dropped, the RTO was only up to about 48 seconds. No reset (RST) segment was sent when the connection was dropped. This is probably because the implementers assumed that the other machine would not be around to receive it. This probably makes more sense than the BSD method of sending a RST, but it makes it impossible to tell (from a probing standpoint) exactly when the connection was dropped.
Experiment 2. RTO with three and eight second ACK delays
This experiment examines how di erent implementations of TCP adjust the retransmission timeout value in the presence of network delays. The retransmission timeout value (RTO) for a TCP connection is calculated based on measured round trip time (RTT) from the time each packet is sent until the ACK for the packet is received. RFC-1122 speci es that a TCP must use Jacobson's algorithm (Jacobson, 1988) for computing the retransmission timeout coupled with Karn's algorithm (Karn and Partridge, 1987) for selecting the RTT measurements. Karn's algorithm ensures that ambiguous round-trip times will not corrupt the calculation of the smoothed round-trip time.
We ran two variations on the same experiment. The experiment was to delay acknowledgments of incoming segments in order to check the response of the sending TCP to this apparent network delay. One variation used an ACK delay of three seconds, the other used a delay of eight. The send script of the fault injection layer was set up to delay each outgoing ACK for 30 ACKs in a row. After doing this, the receive lter started dropping all incoming packets. Each incoming packet was logged. Approaches which depend on monitoring and ltering packets (McCanne and Jacobson, 1993, Comer and Lin, 1994) cannot perform tests like this one because they do not have the ability to manipulate messages. For example, they do not have the ability to direct the system to perform a task such as \delay all ACK packets." We expected that the RTO value of the sender would be adjusted to account for apparent network delays, and that the rst retransmission of a segment would occur more than three (or eight) seconds after the initial transmission of the segment. We also expected that subsequent retransmissions of the same segment would occur with timeouts increasing exponentially from the value of the initial RTO to 64 seconds at which point the RTO would level o . We had not yet established an upper bound for Solaris 2.3 TCP, and hoped to do so in the course of this experiment.
In the SunOS 4.1.3 experiment, when the x-Kernel machine started dropping packets, the rst retransmission occurred about 6.5 seconds after the initial transmission of the segment. Additional retransmissions increased exponentially from 6.5 seconds until they leveled o at 64 seconds. In AIX 3.2.3 the initial retransmission was at eight seconds and retransmissions backed of exponentially as well. The NeXT started at ve seconds and increased exponentially. In all experiments, the next segment was transmitted soon after the rst segment as in the previous no delay experiment. provision in the TCP speci cation for probing idle connections in order to check whether they are still active. However, many TCP implementations provide a mechanism called keep-alive which sends probes periodically that are designed to elicit an ACK from the peer machine. If no ACK is received for a certain number of probes in a row, the connection is assumed dead and is reset and dropped. The TCP speci cation states that by default keep-alive must be turned o , and that the threshold time before which a keep-alive is sent must be 7200 seconds or more. In this experiment, the receive lter of the PFI layer was con gured to drop all incoming packets. The sending machine (the machine for which keep-alive was being tested), opened up a connection to the machine running the x-Kernel machine and turned on keep-alive. The receive lter script in the PFI layer was con gured to log all incoming packets with a timestamp and then drop them. The SunOS 4.1.3 machine sent its rst keep-alive 7202 seconds after the connection was opened. The packet was dropped and was retransmitted 75 seconds later. After retransmitting the keep-alive a total of eight times at 75 second intervals, the Sun sent a TCP reset and dropped the connection. No further tra c was observed from the connection after this time. The format of the Sun keep-alive packet was SEG.SEQ = SND.NXT -1 with 1 byte of garbage data. That is to say, the sender sent a sequence number of one less than the next expected sequence number, with one byte of garbage data. Since this data has already been received (because the window is past it), it should be ACKed by any TCP which receives it. The byte of garbage data is used for compatibility with older TCPs which need it. The AIX 3.2.3 machine sent the rst keep-alive 7204 seconds after the connection was opened. The keep-alive packet was dropped, and eight keep-alives were then retransmitted at 75 second intervals, all of which were dropped. After not receiving ACKs for any of the keepalives, the sender sent a TCP reset and dropped the connection. The format of the AIX keep-alive packet was SEG.SEQ = SND.NXT -1 with 0 bytes of data. The NeXT Mach implementation had the same behavior and used the same type of keep-alive probe as the RS/6000. Note that the keep-alive sent by NeXT and AIX did not contain the one byte of garbage data. The Solaris 2.3 implementation performed di erently than the others. The Solaris machine sent the rst keepalive 6752 seconds after the connection was opened. The keep-alive was dropped, and the Solaris TCP retransmitted it almost immediately and it was dropped again. Keep-alive probes were retransmitted with with exponential backo , and the connection was closed after a total of seven retransmissions. It should be noted that by sending the initial keep-alive packet at 6752 seconds after the connection was opened, the Solaris TCP violated the TCP speci cation which states that the threshold must be 7200 seconds or more. In a variation on this experiment, the incoming keepalive packets were examined to determine the interval between keep-alive probes. 
Experiment 4. Zero window probe test
This experiment examines the sending of zero window probes in di erent TCP implementations. The TCP speci cation indicates that a receiver can tell a sender how many more octets of data it is willing to receive by setting the value in the window eld of the TCP header. If the sender sends more data than the receiver is willing to receive, the receiver may drop the data (unless the window has reopened). Probing of zero (o ered) windows MUST be supported (Braden, 1989 , Postel, 1981 because an ACK segment which reopens the window may be lost if it contains no data. The reason for this is that ACK packets which carry no data are not transmitted reliably. \If zero window probing is not supported, a connection may hang forever when an ACK segment that re-opens the window is lost." This test determined how the SunOS 4.1.3, Solaris 2.3, AIX 3.2.3, and NeXT implementations of TCP perform zero window probing. The machine running the x-Kernel was con gured such that when the driver layer received data, it did not reset the receive bu er space inside the TCP layer. The result was a full window after several segments were received. Incoming zero-window probes were ACKed, and retransmissions of zero window probes was logged. On all implementations except Solaris 2.3, the retransmission timeout of zero-window probes exponentially increased and leveled o at 60 seconds. Solaris used a 56 second upper bound for the timeout value. As long as the probes were ACKed, they continued to be sent. A variation on the zero window probe experiment was also performed. It was the same as the original experiment, except that as soon as x-injector advertised a zero window, the receive lter started dropping incoming packets. The expectation was that the connection would eventually be reset by the sender because no ACKs were received for the probes. Even though the zero-window probes were not ACKed, the SunOS, AIX, and NeXT Mach machines all continued sending probes at 60 second intervals and appeared as if they would do so inde nitely. Solaris did the same at 56 second intervals. The test was allowed to continue for 90 minutes on all machines. This behavior could be a problem because if a receiving TCP which has advertised a zero window crashes, the sending machine could stay in a zero-window probing state until the receiving TCP starts up again and sends a RST in response to a probe. In order to make sure whether this was in fact the case, the same experiment was performed, but once a steady state of sending probes was established, the ethernet was unplugged from the x-injector machine. Two days later, when the ethernet was reconnected, the probes were still being sent by all four machines. The results of this experiment are summarized in Table 4 .
Experiment 5. Reordering of messages
This experiment examines how di erent TCP implementations deal with messages which are received out of order. When a TCP receives segments out of order, it can either queue or drop them. The TCP speci cation in RFC-1122 states that a TCP should queue out of order segments because dropping them could adversely a ect throughput. In this test, the send lter of the fault injection layer was con gured to send two outgoing segments out of order, and the subsequent packet exchange was logged. In order to make sure that the second segment would actually arrive at the receiver rst, the rst segment was delayed by three seconds and any retransmissions of the second segment were dropped.
The result was the same for the Suns running Solaris 2.3 and SunOS 4.1.3, the RS/6000 running AIX 3.2.3, and the NeXT running Mach. The second packet (which actually arrived at the receiver rst), was queued. When the data from the rst segment arrived at the receiver, the receiver ACKed the data from both segments.
Testing of GMP
The objective of the experiments described in this subsection was to test the fault-tolerance capabilities of a prototype implementation of the strong group membership protocol (Jahanian et al., 1993) using the probe and fault injection technique presented earlier. In a distributed environment, a collection of processes (or processors) can be grouped together to provide a service. A server group may be formed to provide high-availability by replicating a function on several nodes or to provide load balancing by distributing a resource on multiple nodes. A group membership protocol (GMP) is an agreement protocol for achieving a consistent systemwide view of the operational processors in the presence of failures, i.e., determining who is up and who is down. The membership of a group may change when a member joins, departs, or is perceived to depart due to random communication delays. A member may depart from a group due to a normal shutdown, such as a scheduled maintenance, or due to a failure. The group membership problem has been studied extensively in the past both for synchronous and asynchronous systems, e.g., (Cristian, 1991 , Ricciardi and Birman, 1991 , Mishra et al., 1990 . A detailed exposition of this problem is beyond the scope of this presentation. Informally, the strong group membership protocol, as described in (Jahanian et al., 1993) , ensures that membership changes are seen in the same order by all members. In this protocol, a group of processors have a unique leader based on the processor id of each member. When a membership change is detected by the leader of the group, it executes a 2-phase protocol to en-Results Comments SunOS 4.1.3 Zero window probes were retransmitted with exponential backo until a 60 second upper bound was reached. Then they were transmitted at 60 second intervals inde nitely, whether they were ACKed or not.
While not a speci cation violation, it seems that transmitting zero window probes forever even when they are not ACKed could pose a problem. AIX 3.2.3 Same as SunOS. NeXT Mach Same as SunOS.
Solaris 2.3 Same as SunOS except that the upper bound on retransmissions was 56 seconds. This is interesting, because the ratio of Solaris/Other Vendors for this upper bound is the same as it was for the Keep-alive interval .
That is to say, 56=60 6752=7200, suggesting that the Solaris implementation has somehow scaled its upper bounds for retransmissions. One suggestion for why this is happening is that timers which the TCP implementation is depending on are not quite correct. For example, the TCP could rely on seeing 7200 ticks of a one second timer between sending keep-alives. If this one second tick actually occurred every .938 seconds, keep-alives would be sent at 6752 second intervals. sure that all members agree on the membership . The leader sends a MEMBERSHIP CHANGE message when a new group is being formed. A processor, upon receiving this message, if the message is from a valid leader, removes itself from its old group. At this point, the group of this processor is said to be in a IN TRANSITION state, i.e. it is a member in transition from one group to another. This processor then sends an ACK message to the leader. The leader, after collecting either ACKs or NAKs from all the members, or when it has timed out waiting, determines what the membership of the new group will be. It then sends out a COMMIT message containing the group membership to all the members. The important aspects of this protocol are that the group changes are acknowledged, and that for some period of time, all the members that will be in a new group are in transition. The implementation of the group membership protocol which we tested was developed by a group of three graduate students as part of a project in a course on distributed systems in the Fall Term, 1993. The students were already familiar with SunOS and socket-level programming on TCP/IP. Furthermore, as part of the course project, they performed several extensive tests by instrumenting their code. The implementation of the GMP was written as a user-level server which ran on SUN machines on top of UDP. A Reliable communication layer was implemented using retransmission timers and sequence numbers. In order to test the group membership daemon (gmd), we inserted the PFI tool into the communication interface code where UDP send and receive calls were made. The change is shown in Figure 5 . The experiments and results follow. As in TCP, a summary of results appears in a table after the discussion on each experiment.
The protocol is deceptively simple, but it has a number of subtle properties which are beyond the scope of this presentation This set of tests involved three machines and various types of packet interruption. The group membership daemons (gmds) were tested for resiliency to delayed or dropped heartbeats, dropped ACKs of MEMBERSHIP CHANGE messages, and dropped COMMIT messages. The results are presented below. Group membership daemons normally send heartbeats to each other in order to keep track of who is up and running. If a gmd does not receive heartbeats from another gmd for a period of time, it will declare to the group leader that the other machine is down. As a simple test of this behavior, the send lter script on one of the machines was con gured to oscillate between two states. In the rst state, heartbeats which the gmd sends were actually sent. In the second state, all outgoing heartbeats were dropped. Because of some code instrumentation by the implementors of gmp, an error turned up when heartbeats to the local machine were dropped. What happened was that when the local machine did not receive heartbeats from itself, it sent out a message to the other members of the group saying that it had died! However, it did not update its own local state very well and instead of forming a singleton group (a group containing only itself), it stayed in the old group but simply marked itself as down. After this, if someone sent it a PROCLAIM message, it would forward it to the group leader, but there was a bug in the code which forwarded the message. A routine was being called with the wrong type of parameter, which resulted in the packet not being forwarded at all. Even though they had instrumented the code, the implementors of the gmp did not nd this error. The reason was that they did not perform this type of test. Even when this bug was xed, because the local gmd did not correctly update its state when it believed itself \dead", it would continue to send bad information to the other gmds. The other machines were not resilient to this type of failure, which was a serious implementation problem. Timing failures on the local machine could actually cause the machine to go \haywire" and have a detrimental e ect on the global state of the entire system. The implementors should have coded for the case in which the machine that has \died" is the local machine. Identical behavior was observed when a gmd was suspended for 30 seconds y . When it was unsuspended, it's timers had expired and the same bugs were observed. Since the group membership daemons could not handle dropped heartbeats to themselves, another test was performed. The test was the same as the previous test, but instead of dropping all heartbeats in the second state, only heartbeats to other members of the group were dropped. The result was that the machine which was dropping heartbeats kept getting kicked out of the group even though it was still active. The machine would then form a singleton group, and then would try to join the others again. It would be admitted to a new group containing all machines, and would remain in the group until it started dropping heartbeats again. When it started dropping heartbeats, the cycle would repeat with the \faulty" machine being kicked out of the group again. A similar experiment was performed in which heartbeats were delayed by ten seconds. The results were exactly the same because delayed heartbeats are like dropped ones. This is because the heartbeat expect timer expires before the delayed heartbeats arrive, having the same e ect as dropped packets. When a new group is formed, there is a two phase commit process. First, the group leader sends a MEMBERSHIP CHANGE message to all prospective members of the new group. It waits for ACK messages from the members, and then sends a COMMIT message to all machines that it received ACKs from. If a machine does not send an ACK message in reply to the MEMBERSHIP CHANGE message from the leader, it should y This was done by sending a SIGTSTP to the running program by typing a <Ctrl>-Z in the shell where the program was running.
It was put back into the foreground 30 seconds later by typing fg into the shell. never receive a COMMIT message and will not be part of the new group. In this test, the receive lter script of the group leader was con gured to drop ACK messages from one of the machines (compsun1). Expected behavior was that compsun1 never would never get committed into any group. In the experiment, gmds were started on two machines and allowed to form a group. Then, the gmd on compsun1 was started. It sent PROCLAIM messages to the other two machines and received a PROCLAIM from the group leader. It replied with a JOIN message, and the group leader initiated the change to a new group by sending MEMBERSHIP CHANGE messages to everybody. The ACK from compsun1 was dropped by the fault injector on the group leader, and the group leader did not send a COMMIT to compsun1. The two original machines formed a group with only themselves in it, and compsun1 stayed in a transitional state. Some time later, compsun1's MEMBERSHIP CHANGE timer expired and it sent out PROCLAIM messages to the others and the whole process repeated. Compsun1 was never admitted to a group. In a variation on the previous test, the receive lter script of compsun1 was con gured to drop incoming COMMIT packets. The expectation was that a group would be formed containing all machines, but compsun1 would not ever accept the view of the group (because it would not see the COMMIT). Since compsun1 would not view itself as in the group, it would not send heartbeats to the other members and would be kicked out of the group. In the experiment, gmds were started on two machines and allowed to form a group. When compsun1 started running, it sent PROCLAIM messages and received a PROCLAIM from the group leader in response. Compsun1 then sent a JOIN message to the leader. The leader sent out MEMBERSHIP CHANGE messages to all machines and all responded with ACKs. The leader then sent COMMITs to everybody. Compsun1 dropped its COMMIT message and stayed in the IN TRANSITION state. The other two machines adopted the new group view which contained everybody. After not receiving any heartbeats from compsun1, the leader declared compsun1 dead and formed a new group which did not contain compsun1. Again, some time later, compsun1's MEMBERSHIP CHANGE timer expired and it sent out PROCLAIM messages to the others and the process repeated. The results of this experiment are summarized in Table 5 .
Experiment 2. Network partitions
The group membership protocol is designed to tolerate network partitions. If a partition occurs, the result should be that separate but non-overlapping groups are formed. In order to test whether this worked or not, several tests were run in which messages between group Results Comments Drop all heartbeats/ suspend gmd Gmd believes it has died because it does not receive heartbeats from itself. There was also a parameter passing bug in the gmd.
Implementors should have coded for the special case in which the local machine has \died" Drop most heartbeats
Machine which was dropping outgoing heartbeats kept getting kicked out of the group. When it started sending heartbeats again, it would be re-admitted, only to be kicked out again when it started dropping heartbeats.
Behaved as speci ed.
Drop ACKs of MEMBERSHIP CHANGE messages
The machine dropping the ACKs was never admitted to a group Behaved as speci ed.
Drop COMMITs
The machine which drops the COMMIT packet stayed in the IN TRANSITION state. Everyone else committed it into their view of the group, but since it did not send heartbeats, it got kicked out of the group.
Behaved as speci ed. In the rst test, the send lter scripts were con gured to oscillate between two states. In the rst state, all outgoing messages that the gmd sends were actually sent. In the second state, the messages were dropped based on destination address. Five machines were involved; they were compsunf1-5g. In the second state, compsunf1-3g could only send messages to each other, and compsunf4,5g were similarly isolated. When the machines started dropping messages, two active but disjoint groups were formed. One consisted of compsunf1-3g, and the other had compsunf4,5g. After a while, the machines entered the original state again and started transmitting to each other. At this time, a group was formed which contained all machines. A while later, the machines entered the second state and the process repeated. In another test, the leader and crown prince were congured to stop sending messages to each other. The crown prince is the machine which is next in line to be the leader if the leader fails. There were two courses of action, but the result was the same for both. In the end, the crown prince was in a singleton group by itself, and everyone else was in a group with the leader. The two possible courses of action were dependent on the ordering of concurrent events. If the leader sent out the MEMBERSHIP CHANGE for the new group before the crown prince, everybody but the crown prince became part of a new group. The crown prince was never admitted to the new group because it was not able to send a JOIN message to the leader. If the crown prince sent out the MEMBERSHIP CHANGE for the new group rst, everybody but the leader joined a group with the crown prince as the new leader. Soon after, however, the original leader sent a PROCLAIM to everybody which was received by all machines except for the new leader (the former crown prince). Since the original leader had a lower IP address than the new leader, each machine responded to the original leader with a JOIN message. A group was formed which consisted of all machines except for the crown prince. The crown prince was never admitted to this group because it was not able to send a JOIN or PROCLAIM message to the leader. The results are summarized in Table 6 .
Experiment 3. Proclaim forwarding
In the group membership protocol, machines which desire to be in a group send PROCLAIM messages to potential members of the group. These messages are either responded to if received by the leader, or forwarded to the leader if received by another group member. When the leader receives a PROCLAIM, it should respond to the originator of the PROCLAIM with either a PROCLAIM of its own or a JOIN message (depending on which machine has a lower IP address). In this test, a machine sent a PROCLAIM to a machine which was not the group leader. In order to do this, the send lter script of the machine compsun1 was con gured to drop PROCLAIMs to the group leader so that only the PROCLAIM to non-leader machines were actually sent. The expectation was that the PROCLAIM would be forwarded to the leader, who would then respond to the PROCLAIM originator (compsun1). The gmds on the two machines were started and allowed to form a group. Compsun1 was then started, and sent PROCLAIMs to the other two machines, but the one to the leader was dropped by the send lter script. The crown prince received the PROCLAIM and forwarded it to the leader, who responded to the crown prince instead of the original sender with a PROCLAIM of its own. Of course, the crown prince simply forwarded the PROCLAIM right back to the leader, who responded with a PROCLAIM.
Results

Comments Partition into two groups
Two separate but disjoint groups were formed, and then when heartbeats were again allowed between all machines, a single group formed again. When the heartbeats were again dropped, the cycle repeated.
Leader/CrownP separation Depending on the timing of dropped heartbeats, there were two possible paths to the same end state. In the end state, the original leader was again the leader, and the original crown prince was not in the group.
Behaved as speci ed. This created a vicious cycle of PROCLAIM sending between the forwarder (in this case the crown prince), and the leader. The original sender of the PROCLAIM (compsun1) never received a PROCLAIM in response to its PROCLAIM, which was a serious problem. The code was xed so that the group leader always responds to PROCLAIM originator instead of the PROCLAIM sender, because the sender may only be forwarding the message. The results of this experiment are summarized in Table 7 .
Experiment 4. Timer test
The group membership protocol uses timers extensively. There are timers set for sending and receiving heartbeats, sending PROCLAIM messages, joining groups, and preparing to commit new groups, among others. It is important that during some phases of the protocol, all timers be unset. For example, it doesn't make sense to time out waiting for a heartbeat message when you are waiting for the COMMIT message for a new group. This test exercised the code which unsets the timers when a machine receives a MEMBERSHIP CHANGE. In the test, the receive lter for compsun1 was con gured such that it was allowed to join one group. After that, when it received a second MEMBERSHIP CHANGE (when another group was formed) it started dropping all incoming COMMIT and heartbeat packets.
To begin the test, compsun1 and the group leader were started and formed an initial group. When a third machine was started later, compsun1 received a second MEMBERSHIP CHANGE and went into a state in which incoming heartbeat and COMMIT messages were dropped. Soon after, compsun1 was still in a transitional state, when no timers (except for the MEMBERSHIP CHANGE timer) were supposed to be set. However, compsun1 timed out waiting for a heartbeat message from the leader. This means that the heartbeat expect timer for the leader was not unset when the IN TRANSITION state of the protocol was entered. It turned out that there was an error in the code which unregisters timeouts. In the procedure, if an argument is NULL, all timeouts of the same type are unregistered. If the argument is non-null, only the rst is unregistered. It worked the opposite of how it should have because of a logic error, and was xed. The results of the experiment are shown in Table 8 .
RELATED WORK
Numerous approaches have been proposed in the past for evaluation and validation of system dependability including formal methods, analytical modeling, and simulation and experimental techniques. Past research closely related to the work presented here can be classied into two areas: (a) network monitor and lter-based approaches; and (b) fault injection techniques.
Packet Monitoring and ltering:
To support network diagnostics and analysis tools, most Unix systems have some kernel support for giving userlevel programs access to raw and unprocessed network tra c. Most of today's workstation operating systems contain such a facility including NIT in SunOS and Ultrix Packet Filter in DEC's Ultrix. To minimize data copying across kernel/user-space protection boundaries, a kernel agent, called a packet lter, is often used to discard unwanted packets as early as possible. Past work on packet lters, including the pioneering work on the CMU/Stanford Packet Filter (Mogul et al., 1987) , a more recent work on BSD Packet Filter (BPF) which uses a register-based lter evaluator (McCanne and Jacobson, 1993) , and the Mach Packet Filter (MPF) (Yuhara et al., 1994) which is an extension of the BPF, are related to the work presented in this paper. In the same spirit as packet ltration methods for network monitoring, our approach inserts a lter to intercept messages that arrive from the network. While packet lters are used primarily to gather trace data by passively monitoring the network, our approach uses lters to intercept and manipulate packets exchanged between protocol participants. Furthermore, our approach requires that a lter be inserted at various levels in a protocol stack, unlike packet lters that are inserted on top of link-level device drivers and below the listening applications. Another closely related work is the active probing approach proposed in a recent paper by Comer and Lin (Comer and Lin, 1994) to study ve TCP implementa-
Results
Comments
Proclaim forwarding When a proclaim was sent to a non leader machine, it was forwarded to the leader. However, instead of the leader responding to the original sender, it responded to the machine which forwarded the message. This caused a proclaim loop.
There was a bug in the proclaim forwarding code. This bug was xed. (Comer and Lin, 1994) , our approach allows other tests that are not possible with techniques that are based primarily on monitoring and gathering trace data. In particular, our approach di ers from the active probing technique in four major aspects. First, using a fault injection layer below the TCP layer in the x-Kernel protocol stack, we are able to intercept and manipulate the TCP packets without having access to the SunOS, AIX, NeXT Mach, or Solaris TCP source code. The manipulation of TCP packets allows various operations such as delay, reorder, and selective message loss. Second, our script-driven approach makes writing complex test scripts relatively easy in a short time. A protocol developer can use a combination of prede ned lters and user-de ned procedures written in C to develop complex scripts. Third, while an approach based on passive monitoring or active probing can simulate crash failures, more complicated failure models such as omission and timing failures are nearly impossible to test using these methods. A richer set of failure models can be tested using the approach presented here. Finally, although our approach can be more intrusive than active probing, it is intended to be the basis for a tool that can be applied to testing application-level services as well as communication protocols. Our experience in testing the fault-tolerance capabilities of the Group Membership Protocol (GMP), as described in Section 4, seems to support this view.
Fault injection approaches:
Various techniques based on fault-injection have been proposed to test fault-tolerance capabilities of systems. Hardware fault-injection (Finelli, 1987 , Shin and Lee, 1986 , Arlat et al., 1989 and simulation approaches for injecting hardware failures (Choi et al., 1990 , Goswami and Iyer, 1993 , Czeck and Siewiorek, 1990 have received much attention in the past. Recent efforts have focused on software fault-injection by inserting faults into system memory to emulate errors (Chillarege and Bowen, 1989, Segall et al., 1988) . Others have emulated fault-injection into CPU components (Kanawati et al., 1992) , typically by setting voltages on pins or wires. However, faultinjection and testing dependability of distributed systems has received very little attention until recently (Echtle and Chen, 1991 , Echtle and Leu, 1992 , Avresky et al., 1992 , Han et al., 1993 . Most of the recent work in this area have focused on evaluating dependability of distributed protocol implementations through statistical metrics. For example, the work reported in (Arlat et al., 1990) calculates fault coverages of a communication network server by injecting physical faults, and it tests certain properties of an atomic multicast protocol in the presence of faults. Other work can be characterized as probabilistic approaches to test generation Chen, 1991, Avresky et al., 1992) . The work reported in (Han et al., 1993) focuses on CPU and memory fault injection into a distributed real-time system; this approach also allows inducing communication faults with a given statistical distribution that is speci ed by the system implementor. The Delayline tool presented in (Ingham and Parrington, 1994) allows the user to introduce delays into user-level protocols. The tool is used mainly for emulating a wide-area network in a local network development environment and allows the user to specify delays on certain paths which the application is using. This work and that reported in (Echtle and Chen, 1991) are closest to the approach proposed here. Rather than estimating fault coverages for evaluating dependability of distributed systems, this work focuses on techniques for identifying violations of protocol speci cations and for detecting design or implementations errors. The proposed research complements the previous work by focusing on deterministic manipulation of messages via scripts that can be speci ed by the protocol developer. The approach is based on the premise that injecting faults into a protocol implementation requires orchestrating a computation into hard-to-reach states. Hence, deterministic control on ordering of certain concurrent messages is a key to this approach.
INTRUSIVENESS ON TARGET DIS-TRIBUTED SYSTEMS
An important issue in the experimental evaluation and validation of the fault-tolerance capabilities of distributed protocols is the intrusiveness of the approach on the target system. The inherent necessity of an instrumentation may introduce a \Heisenberg e ect" on the execution of the target system. Several features of the script-driven probing and fault injection approach attempt to minimize the intrusiveness on a target protocols:
Message-level fault injection and probing: Since the approach proposed by this research tests a protocol implementation by manipulating the incoming or outgoing messages, it is often possible to test an implementation without instrumenting the target protocol code. The instrumentation takes place by introducing a PFI layer below the target protocol layer. Clearly, the path length increases, but the code for the target layer is not necessarily modi ed. Probing and monitoring from a non-target platform: Similar to passive monitors that observe network tra c, it is possible in our approach to instrument one node in the system which collects data about the behavior of the target participants by probing.
Observe that the target system is not instrumented. This is particularly useful when testing protocols for which the source code is unavailable. As described in the discussion on TCP experiments, we have been very successful in demonstrating this approach on four commercial implementations of TCP without access to the source code, i.e., the target machines were not instrumented.
While the intrusiveness issue is signi cant for both the logical correctness as well as the timing correctness of an implementation, it is particularly signi cant in hard real-time systems where timing predictability may be disturbed by the additional overhead of a fault injection mechanism. Several important questions may be formulated including: Will unintended errors (including timing faults) be introduced into the system by the fault injection mechanism? Is the target system less predictable? Can one quantify precisely the intrusiveness of a fault injection experiment on the timing behavior of the target system? The intrusiveness of the proposed fault injection approach on a hard real-time distributed system is an important issue which we are addressing in the new implementation of our PFI tool. The new version of tool is being developed on Real-Time Mach, and utilizes features of Real-Time Mach such as scheduler feedback and capacity reservation to quantify and to compensate for intrusiveness of the tool.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presented a technique for probing and fault injection of distributed protocols. To demonstrate the practicality of script-driven probing and fault injection, experiments were performed that tested several implementations of a transport layer communication protocol, TCP, and an application-level protocol, GMP. These experiments revealed several major design/implementation errors and subtle violations of the protocol speci cations. We were surprised by the power of a few relatively simple primitives o ered to a protocol developer who uses the PFI tool. In addition to its relative simplicity and demonstrated e ectiveness, other advantages of the proposed approach include: portability to di erent platforms; uniform treatment of network communication and application-level protocols; support for deterministic and probabilistic testing; and support for user-de ned test scripts. The proposed approach, however, has several limitations which highlight some of the ongoing research activities of this project: Timing intrusiveness on a target protocol: As described in the previous section, although the technique presented in this paper attempts to minimize the intrusiveness of fault injection on a target protocol, it is primarily suitable for asynchronous protocols and soft real-time systems. The previous section also discussed ongoing research on minimizing or quantifying the intrusiveness of a PFI layer on a target hard real-time system. Speci cation of PFI scripts: In the approach described in this paper, probe and fault injection scripts are handcrafted for a given protocol. In the short term, we plan to provide a nite-state machine-based graphical user interface for specifying scripts and for composing them into more complex lters. A long-term research question involves automatic generation of PFI scripts from a formal speci cation of a protocol.
Methodology or formal framework for orchestrating a computation: Although script-driven probing and fault injection has been applied to several complex communication protocols and distributed applications, we need to develop a formal framework for orchestrating a computation. Past work on global snapshots or global predicate detection (Babaoglu and Marzullo, 1993) is closely related to this problem. Furthermore, we need to identify a minimal set of primitives for injecting faults given a certain failure model.
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